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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Rumors of partiality quickly turned into allegations of bias February when 
publicized documents showed just how strong the financial ties were between the 
lobbying groups working against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the 
wife of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.  Just how much did Ginny Thomas earn 
as a lobbyist against President Obama’s healthcare bill?  The Washington Post obtained a 
copy of the letter signed by seventy-four House Democrats to Justice Thomas which says 
Ginny Thomas received $686,589 over a four year span from The Heritage Foundation, a 
prominent opponent of healthcare reform. Representative Anthony Weiner (D- NY) 
writes in the letter: 
The appearance of a conflict of interest merits recusal 
under federal law.  From what we have already seen, the 
line between your impartiality and you and your wife's 
financial stake in the overturn of healthcare reform is 
blurred.  Your spouse is advertising herself as a lobbyist 
who has "experience and connections" and appeals to 
clients who want a particular decision - they want to 
overturn health care reform.1 
 Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a 
particular legal proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest.  Is $686,589 paid by a 
lobbying group to the wife of a Supreme Court Justice enough of a financial stake to 
warrant a conflict of interest and ensuing judicial recusal?  The answer is yes, but Justice 
Thomas will not recuse because of the lifetime commissions awarded to Justices – free of 
recusal mandates and ensuing political consequences. The U.S. Constitution is known for 
its system of checks and balances, yet there is no check on the recusal power of the 
Supreme Court.2 They are themselves solely responsible for judging their ability to be 
impartial.  This presents a constitutional problem and the thesis of this research – Justices 
partialities are consistently influencing decisions because of lenient recusal standards in the 
Supreme Court. 
 All levels of the judicial system and some administrative agencies in the United 
States apply the concept of recusal, but this paper focuses solely on the Supreme Court and 
patterns of modern day Supreme Court justices – citing controversial and overlooked 
recusal affairs to prove that a consistent flaw exists.3  The methodology employed involves: 
                                                 
1
 Weiner, Anthony to Clarence Thomas, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2011, in Sonmez, Felicia, “House 
Democrats say Justice Thomas should recuse himself in health-care case,” The Washington Post, February 
9, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/02/house-democrats-say-justice-th.html (accessed 
February 13, 2011). 
2
 The first and only instance where a Supreme Court justice was subject to impeachment proceedings was 
in 1804.  The U.S. House of Representatives voted to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the signatories of the 
Declaration of Independence, on the grounds that his federalist background was influencing his Supreme 
Court opinions.  The Senate acquitted him of all charges. This helped establish the precedent of judicial 
independence and judicial review. (Dilliard, Irving, "Samuel Chase," In The Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court, 1789–1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions, ed. Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel (New 
York: Chelsea House, 1969).) 
3
 It is necessary to note that of all the cases that have been brought before the high court only a miniscule 
fraction are surrounded by recusal controversy.  This paper studies a slice of that miniscule fraction in 
contention.   
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 (1) specific case studies chosen by the researcher, examining; a) Justices’ professional and 
personal background; b) ideologies; c) Court make-up and; d) recusal standards at the time; 
(2) and a random sample via the Supreme Court Database, examining; a) who disqualifies; 
b) recusant’s ideology; c) recusant’s reason for disqualifying; d) an ideological comparison 
of disqualifications.  
 There is some confusion on the procedure of Supreme Court judicial recusal: what 
is law and what is precedent?  First, there are two laws that govern judicial recusal.  Title 
28 of the United States Code provides the two standards, Section 144 and Section 455 (not 
obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should recuse themselves.4  
Section 144 applies exclusively to federal district court judges.5  Section 455 entitled 
“Disqualification of Justice, Judge, or Magistrate Judge” covers standards concerning “any 
justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States.”6 Section 455 (a): “any justice, 
judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 
which his partiality might reasonably be questioned.”7  “Shall” provides Justices a basis 
against discretion because it indicates a question on recusals instead of a requirement.8  
 Title 28 Section 455 (b) deals with conflicts of interest: (1) where he/she has 
personal knowledge of the evidence concerning the proceedings or has previously 
expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome (personal bias or prejudice); (2) where he/she 
has previously served as a lawyer or witness concerning the same case; (3) where he/she 
has come into contact with the matter while in government employment; (4) where he/she, 
spouse or child has a financial stake in the outcome of the case; and a prohibition of 
relationships, down to the third degree.9  There are many instances in Supreme Court 
history where Justices have not adhered to these seemingly definitive terms.  
 Supreme Court recusal “precedent” is an ambiguous term.  Routinely Justices 
agree on recusal standards only partially and long-term agreement is precarious since they 
have the privilege to change their mind at any moment.  Also, agreement comes in small 
doses since there nine separate interpretations of the five parts of Section 455 – each part 
being multifaceted in itself.  Problems caused by the different interpretations of judicial 
recusal law are just the tip of the iceberg; precedent is also sensitive to historical 
developments of the law.  The most influential changes to Supreme Court recusal 
procedure occurred in 1911, 1948, and 1974 and additionally interpreted by Supreme Court 
justices throughout the Court’s history, most recently in 1993.  
 In 1911 Congress enacted Section 144 of Title 28 U.S.C. enabling litigants to 
request a judicial disqualification motion, also known as an affidavit, based on a Justice’s 
personal bias or prejudice.10  Though Congress intended this motion to have a peremptory 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
 Section 144 is entitled “Bias or Prejudice of Judge” and is extremely similar to Section 455. 
5
 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal: Principles, Process and Problems (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing Ltd, 2009), 56. 
6
 Ibid., 56. 
7
 Ibid., 59. 
8
 Ibid., 63. 
9
 Third degree relationships are present between individuals with 1/8 (12.5%) of a genetic link and apply to 
455(b)(1) through 455(b)(4). Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
10
 Though Section 144 applies only to federal district court judges it is important to mention it when studying 
Supreme Court recusal policy because Section 144 was and can still be interpreted by the Supreme Court – 
conveying how the Supreme Court views recusal arbitration in relation to lower courts.  Hammond, Judicial 
Recusal, 56. 
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 effect, the Supreme Court decided in 1921 that a judge had the power to choose if the 
application for disqualification and accompanying affidavit were legally “sufficient,” – that 
is to say “sufficient” in the opinion of the judge-in-question.11  
 Congress pushed through further developments in 1948 affecting Section 455.  A 
first modification eliminated the requirement that a party initiate the motion for recusal.  A 
second development was the addition of the word “substantial” in Section 455 (b)(4), “only 
if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest.”12  
These two changes worked against the peremptory-style changes made in 1911, widening 
the capacity for judicial discretion pertaining to recusal.  
 In 1974 the text of U.S.C. Section 455 (a) was changed from “in the opinion of the 
judge” to “ might reasonably be questioned,” diminishing the judicial discretion permitted 
by the 1948 development.13 The Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 vote that U.S.C. Title 455 
(a)’s language – “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his partiality might 
reasonably be questioned”14 – refers to when a “reasonable person” would expect a judge 
to be aware of the questionable partiality, regardless of whether or not the judge himself 
knew circumstances were questionable.15  But in the same year, the “duty to sit” criteria 
was eliminated by Congressional amendments which was aimed at widening the scope for 
judicial disqualification.16   
 In 1993 the Court formally but not officially acted to better explain their 
individualized criteria for their own recusals, though minimally.17  Seven Supreme Court 
Justices signed the collaboratively written “Statement of Recusal Policy,” but are 
independently aiming to uphold the policy within, which is restricted solely to Section 
455 (b)(2) concerning his/her or relative’s legal association:18  
Current participation as lawyer, and not merely past 
involvement in earlier stages of the litigation, is required [for 
a Supreme Court Justice’s recusal]. A relative’s partnership 
status, or participation in earlier stages of the litigation, is 
relevant, therefore, only under one of two less specific 
                                                 
11
 Berger v. US (1921), a World War I espionage case where German American petitioners were accused of 
espionage and filed a motion for the trial judge’s recusal based on statements the judge had allegedly said – 
for example, “one must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German Americans 
in this country.  Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty.” When the constitutional question of whether the 
judge should have recused himself (because he did not) reached the Supreme Court, the Justices decided that 
the affidavit should have little influence on judicial disqualification. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 33-34 
(1921). 
12
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 58. 
13
 Stephen Wasby, “Issues in Judicial Recusal,” International Journal of Public Administration, 19(1),  
(New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1996), 89. 
14
 Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp (1988) revolved around whether a judgment ought to be 
reversed if it is found out that a judge who decided the case was also unknowingly closely-connected 
financially to the outcome of the case. Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
15
 John Paul Stevens delivered opinion in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 
(1988). 
16
 Ibid., 91. 
17
 Stephen Wasby, “Issues in Judicial Recusal,” International Journal of Public Administration, 19(1),  
(New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1996), 82. 
18
 “Statement of Recusal Policy” was signed by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg. David Souter and Harry Blackmun did not sign the agreement. (“Statement of Recusal Policy,” 
Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with Hofstra Law Review). 
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 provisions of Section 455, which require recusal when the 
judge knows that the relative has “an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding,” 
Section 455 (b), or when for any reason the judge’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” Section 455 
(a).19 
 The precision of the Statement contributes to diminishing the vague nature of 
Supreme Court recusal policy while simultaneously broadening a Justice’s recusal 
discretion. Though the Statement furthered recusal clarity at the time, it bears less weight 
now that only four current Justices endorse it.20 
 The American Bar Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct and Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct is accredited little to none in regard to recusal policy. Outside of the 
Supreme Court, 49 of 50 U.S. states espouse moral regulations similar to those in the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, pushing for recusal when impropriety, the appearance of 
impropriety, and the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.21  Additionally, 
the 1973 Judicial Conference of the United States, adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct 
for United States Judges, now known as the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.22  
The Code of Conduct is the federal equivalent of the ABA’s Model Code, calling for 
compliance from all judges, but states that “not every violation of the code should lead to 
disciplinary action” and so lends a hand to the ambiguity of Supreme Court recusal 
policy.23  
 The most incomprehensible problem with Supreme Court recusal policy is the 
effect of ideological and strategic choices influencing a Justice’s vote, because recusal is 
the only lawful way to remove an important vote from an evenly matched case.24  
Ideologically, a Justice votes in order to shape the constitution to their way of thinking; by 
disqualifying themselves, he/she abates their power to do so.  Strategically, politics within 
the Court, i.e. how evenly split the vote is, plays a part in the likelihood of disqualification; 
predictions of an evenly split vote discourage disqualification.  Because the Supreme Court 
makes its decisions in private, the only way to study these recusal politics of the Supreme 
Court is to study memoirs and papers written by past Justices, as analyzed in Part II.25  
 In brief, if a Justice is incapacitated or flouting their constitutional pledge, clearly 
there should be a more convenient route outside of Congressional impeachment that would 
remove him/her from office.  If judges of a lower court are forced to adhere to a 
                                                 
19
 “Statement of Recusal Policy,” Supreme Court of the United States.  
20
 The only current Justices signed to the Statement are Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Hammond, 
Judicial Recusal, 66. 
21
 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
22
 The Judicial Conference is the principal policy making administration for the U.S. judiciary. U.S. 
Department of Justice, Judicial Conference of the United States, “Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges,” Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2A, Ch. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, 
revised 2009), 2. 
23
 The Code of Conduct delves deeper into particular instances of the appearance of a conflict of interest. 
Ibid., 3. 
24
 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 86. 
25
 Justice deliberations are private because (1) it protects the Justices from public influence and sentiment 
and (2) deliberations do not necessarily reflect the final decision and opinion, which may not be written for 
weeks or months. (Epstein, Lee and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: 
Institutional Powers and Constraints, 7th Ed., Washington, DC: CQ Press (2011), 22. 
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 particularized procedure, recusal or otherwise, the Supreme Court should as well, as they 
say, lead by example.  If a Justice is explicitly breaking recusal policy, as stated in the text 
of the Congressional amendments, there should be repercussions or at least protocol for 
those actions.  When a Justice or multiple Justices determine a recusal is appropriate, there 
should be procedures in order to maintain the constitutional purpose and effectiveness of 
the Supreme Court.  Part II of this paper outlines more specific problems/inconsistencies 
with U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 and signify that real inconsistencies in Supreme Court 
recusal policy, and in Part III I’ll examine the possibilities of change, if Congress decided 
to proceed with adjustments to the statute. 
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 II. ANALYSIS 
 
This part is split into two sections. Section one examines specific circumstances, the 
justice’s past, the Supreme Court makeup at the time, recusal standards (formal and 
informal) at the time, and any other particulars I think necessary to mention.  I organize the 
analysis into categories based on established Congressional grounds for recusal and then 
arrange contentious cases under the appropriate recusal category.   In most cases, because 
of the distinctiveness of each recusal issue, it so happens that recusal precedent is almost 
always affected – and so I examine those effects as well. 
In section two I use The Supreme Court Database to create a random sample and 
with that sample I compare the reasons for recusal and the ideology of the recusing justice, 
per case.26  Technicalities with the data result in only running a statistical analysis on cases 
where less than nine judges participated in the vote; further detail in the introduction of 
Section Two.  
SECTION ONE: CASE STUDIES 
 
i.  U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (a) 
 Section 455 (a) deals with the appearance of impartiality: “any justice, judge or 
magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 
his partiality might reasonably be questioned.”27  The language in this section is not 
comprehensive and fosters the most opportunity within all the sections of the statute for 
judicial discretion; any type of past and/or current associations with parties or indirect 
participants in a Supreme Court docketed lawsuit may cause a recusal issue.  It is for this 
reason that past and current associations with parties to a docketed case are, in large part, 
found to be the most controversial recusal cases. Associations in this sense could mean a 
friendship with a litigant, professional history with a party, prior work on the case, 
previously stated bias, or a unique combination of them all.  
 
 (1) Current Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia declined to recuse himself in the 2004 
Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia case in which his good 
friend, then Vice President Cheney, was a party.  After the Supreme Court accepted and 
docketed the case, Justice Scalia accepted an invitation to fly with Cheney on a government 
plane to go on a hunting trip.  The party seeking Justice Scalia’s recusal referenced §455 
(a) – saying the justice’s impartiality in this case “might reasonably be questioned.”28  
Justice Scalia responded to the assertion in an issued Memorandum that his friendship with 
Cheney did not jeopardize his impartiality, that Supreme Court Justices cannot be bribed by 
plane rides and hunting trips, and finished up by declaring that many Justices make it onto 
the Supreme Court exactly because of friends in high places.29  Then Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist also issued an opinion on the matter – saying each Justice decides for himself 
whether to recuse in a case; the way in which they come to that decision varies but that 
                                                 
26
 The Supreme Court database is available online at http://scdb.wustl.edu. The lasted version, which I am 
using, was released February 11, 2011. The Supreme Court Database has a comprehensive set of 200 facts 
about each case the Supreme Court has judged from 1953 to 2009 and a less comprehensive set of similar 
facts about cases dating back to 1946. 
27
 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
28
 Ibid., 4. 
29
 Ibid., 5. 
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 each Justice “strives to abide by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 455, the law enacted 
by Congress dealing with the subject.”30  This recusal case is important because we see that 
an irrefutable friendship with a party to a case, no matter how current or strong, is not an 
irrefutable “appearance of bias.” If it were, according to Rehnquist, Scalia would have 
recused himself based on “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 28 Section 455.” 
 
(2)  A similar recusal issue was present in the very politicized Supreme Court case related 
to the Watergate scandal of 1972.  United States v Nixon reached the Supreme Court in 
1974 to decide whether executive privilege could keep Nixon from handing over the 
incriminating audiotapes to the Special Prosecutor.31  Of the nine justices on the Court, 
Richard Nixon appointed four.  Of the four Nixon appointments, then Associate Justice 
William Rehnquist was the only one to recuse himself, citing his past association with the 
Nixon administration.32  This may be related to the fact that upon Nixon’s election and 
prior to serving on the Supreme Court, Rehnquist served as Assistant Attorney General of 
the Office of Legal Counsel.  If Rehnquist’s past association with the Nixon administration 
had enough of an impact that his impartiality might be questioned, one has to wonder if the 
other three Nixon appointees had strong associations with Nixon as well.33  Then Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger, who was at one point on Nixon’s list for possible Vice 
Presidential candidates, was the only other Justice with a questionable recusal because of 
his friendship with the President.  The alleged fact that Burger was originally supposed to 
vote in favor of Nixon, fuels fire to the recusal issue, but because he steered his vote to the 
majority makes any recusal problem revolving around U.S. v Nixon moderate.34 The reality 
is that the different interpretations of recusal statute, like those of Burger’s and Rehnquist’s, 
compounds the difficulties surrounding the development of a reliable Supreme Court 
judicial recusal precedent.  Justices alter their interpretations with time, further 
complicating recusal procedure.  Examining Laird v Tatum [Section ii. (2)] will be an 
example of just that complication. 
 
(3) Those pushing for Justice Thomas’s recusal in Florida v. US site 455 (a), saying that a 
lobbying firm paying over $650,000 to a Justice’s wife is a sufficient amount to claim that 
his partiality can reasonably be questioned.   
 In the letter to Clarence Thomas, House Democrats use Section 455 (b) (4) as the 
rationale for his recusal.  Proponents of the Justice’s decision to sit use the more specific 
particularities of Section 455 (b) (4) to defend their point of view: 
Section 455 means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, 
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other 
                                                 
30
 Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy, Jan 26, 2004, reprinted in “Irrecusable & 
Unconfirmable,” 7 Green Bag 2d, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 
(2004), 280. 
31
 Stanley L. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 508..  
32
 "Rehnquist recused himself in the case, citing his past association with the Nixon Administration."  
Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 508. 
33
 The other three Nixon appointments besides Rehnquist were Warren E. Burger, Harry Blackmun, and 
Lewis F. Powell.  Prior to being appointed, Burger was on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, Blackmun was on an 8th Circuit Judge and Powell was in private practice.  
34
 Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice for All: William J. Brennan, Jr., and the decisions that transformed America 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 251.  
7
Beamer: Judicial Recusal: On the Brink of Constitutional Change
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2012
 participant in the affairs of a party.  The prohibition applies 
‘only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially 
affect the value of the interest,’ but the proviso extends only 
to a mutual insurance company or a similar proprietary 
interest.35 
They argue that (1) The Heritage Foundation and Ginny Thomas’s previous 
employment is not a party in Florida v. U.S., (2) the outcome of the case would not 
substantially affect them, and (3) The Heritage Foundation is not a proprietary interest.  
However, delving deeper into the context of Section 455 (b) (4) the democrats are wise to 
mention in their letter the significance that Thomas did not, perhaps purposefully, disclose 
his wife’s earnings.36  But recusal specifications revolving around Justice-lobbying 
connections are absence and even if the eight other Justices, seventy-four house democrats, 
or anyone else of political significance directly petition Clarence Thomas to disqualify 
himself in Florida v. US when it reaches the Supreme Court, the decision remains 
arbitrarily his.37 
 
ii. U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (1) 
Section 455 (b) (1): where he/she has personal knowledge of case evidence or has 
previously expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome (personal bias or prejudice); and a 
prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.38  Developments in regard to this 
area of Section 455 are few and far between, however controversy is rampant.  The issues 
revolve around the very fine line between opinion and prejudice.  According to the text any 
type of past and/or current viewpoint could or could not be considered bias depending on 
the examiners point of view.  We will examine some of the comments past and current 
Justices have made concerning cases that have been argued in the Supreme Court.  
 
(1) Rehnquist’s “past association” recusal in U.S. v Nixon is attributed to his previous 
involvement as Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Assistant for President 
Nixon.39  Similarly, Laird v Tatum (1972) was a case in which Rehnquist had prior 
associations because of his time as Assistant Attorney General.   The Office of Legal 
Counsel is in charge of providing legal advice to the Executive Branch agencies and the 
President through written opinions and oral advice.  The Assistant Attorney General is in 
charge of that Office and authorizes the legal advice that is provided.40  While in this 
position Rehnquist gave testimony in front of Congress on whether he thought a 
Department of Defense surveillance scheme on “dissident” civilians critical of the Nixon 
                                                 
35
 Hammond, Judicial Recual, 59-60. 
36
 Anthony Weiner to Clarence Thomas, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2011, in The Washington Post.  
37
 There are rare instances in U.S. Supreme Court history where Justices have collectively manipulated 
their votes in order to diminish the voting power of another. In the 1970s Justice William Douglas suffered 
a stroke and the other eight Justices met in secret to agree that they would not pass down a 5 – 4 judgment 
where Douglas was in the majority. (Ross E. Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme 
Judicial Disqualification,” Green Bag 2d, Vol. 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2006), 88.) 
38
 Third degree relationships are present between individuals with 1/8 (12.5%) of a genetic link.  
(Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59.) 
39
 Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 508. 
40
 U.S. Department of Justice, “About the Office,” http://www.justice.gov/osg/ (Accessed March 9, 2011). 
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 administration and mostly the Vietnam War presented a constitutional issue.41 He also 
allegedly was a custodian of some of the digital evidence.42  His participation in the 
Supreme Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the program was seen as controversial.  
In a rare instance where a Justice publicly defends their decision to sit, Rehnquist said that 
his Congressional testimony expressed the position of his client, the government, and not 
his own.43  However if we compare this recusal issue area to the U.S. v Nixon case, 
certainly Rehnquist’s professional capacity and involvement was similar in both because he 
held the same professional relationship to both; why then does he only recuse from one of 
the cases instead of both?  Strategic justification is the most likely motive; Rehnquist’s vote 
has no effect in an 8 – 0 vote in U.S. v Nixon, whereas his vote bears significant weight 
when it is the deciding vote in Laird v. Tatum (5 – 4).  
 
iii. U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (2) 
 Section 455 (b) (2): where he/she has previously served as a lawyer or witness 
concerning the same case; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.44 
The language in this section is actually one of the more defined in all of Section 455.  As I 
stated in the introduction, some Justices interpreted detailed positions for when their 
relative is affiliated with a case (1993 “Statement of Recusal Policy”), but the Justice’s 
personal affiliation is still open to wide interpretation. Every Justice was previously 
employed in private legal practice or by the government and it is common that a case they 
worked on or participated in might reach the Supreme Court. Arbitrary recusal practices in 
this area of 455 (b) (2) show wide discrepancies among Justices’ decisions to participate.  
 
(1)  Before joining the Supreme Court in 1967 Thurgood Marshall was Solicitor General 
for President Lyndon B. Johnson and because of this, Marshall recused himself from about 
40 percent of the cases in his first term.45  Despite this strict rational his most referenced 
and critically revered recusals were those related to the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  Marshall’s involvement with the NAACP 
began in 1934 and he won his first of 29 Supreme Court cases in 1940, the same year he 
was nominated to NAACP Chief Counsel – a position he held until an appointment to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in 1961.46  These decades of involvement 
                                                 
41
 Jeffrey Stempel, “Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit,” Buffalo Law 
Review, vol. 57, (Buffalo Law Review, 2009) 
http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/57_3/Stempel%20Web%2057_3.pdf (accessed March 30, 
2011), 853.  
42
 Arthur John Keeffe, “Current Legal Literature: By What Standards Shall They Be Judged?” American 
Bar Association Journal, 60 A.B.A.J. (1974), 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/abaj60&div=275&g_sent=1&collection=journals 
(accessed March 31, 2011), 1582. 
43
 Wasby, “Issues in Judicial Recusal,” 90. 
44
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
45
 A rational like this falls under the recusal umbrella of Section 455 (b) (3).  (Adam Liptak, “When a 
Justice and a Case Are Too Close,” The New York Times, August 24, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/weekinreview/25liptak.html (accessed March 12, 2011).) 
46
 Mark Tushnet, “A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 44 (Summer, 
1992): 1277-1299, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1229060 (accessed 14 April 2011), 1277. 
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 as Chief Counsel were the basis for his routine recusal in NAACP cases.47  After his 
retirement in 1991 and passing in 1993, his Supreme Court records were opened to the 
public revealing a letter of memorandum he sent to the other Justices asking for advisement 
on his past and current recusal policy in relation to the NAACP.48   
His past practice had been, he said, to “routinely disqualify 
myself from all cases in which the NAACP has participated 
as a party or as an intervener.”  Enough time had passed, 
however, since he had left the NAACP, “that continued 
adherence to this self-imposed blanket disqualification rule 
is no longer necessary.” And so he planned “in the future not 
to recuse myself in cases in which the NAACP is a party or 
an intervener, unless the circumstances of an individual case 
persuade me, as with all cases, to do otherwise.”49 
Not only did the eight other Justices condone the changes he proposed in his 
memorandum, Justice John Paul Stevens was “delighted.”50  The four conservative Justices 
supported Marshall’s decision, proving that recusals cannot be based staunchly on strategic 
behavior, because a conservative’s strategy is pushing liberals to recuse, maximizing the 
scope for a conservative decision. This proves how judicious Justices can be when 
preparing to recuse, but it depends on the Justice.   
 
iv.  U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (3) 
Section 455 (b) (3): where he/she has come into contact with the matter while in 
government employment; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.51  
This subsection of text refers almost exclusively to a Justice’s previous government 
employment and recusing when government associated material is brought before the 
Supreme Court. Some examples would include Associate Justice William Rehnquist 
(previously Assistant Attorney General), Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall (previously 
Solicitor General), Chief Justice John Marshall (previously Secretary of State), Chief 
Justice Roger Taney (previously Secretary of the Treasury), Associate Justice John 
McKinley (previously U.S. Senator), Chief Justice Charles Hughes (previously Secretary of 
State) and many more.52   
 
(1)  Current Associate Justice Elena Kagan exemplifies when a Justice practices routine 
recusals in relation to prior legal association.  As the 112th Supreme Court Justice, Kagan 
came to the Court directly from her position as Solicitor General (SG) under the Obama 
                                                 
47
 Thurgood Marshall College, “About Thurgood Marshall,” University of California San Diego, 
http://marshall.ucsd.edu/about/thurgood-marshall.html (accessed April 1, 2011). 
48
  Records are kept at the Library of Congress. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the 
Conference, Oct. 4, 1984, in Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Library of Conress, Manuscript Division, box 
1405, folder 14, reprinted in Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 93-107. 
49
 Justice Thurgood Marshall quoted in Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 81. 
50
 Ibid., 82. 
51
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
52
 A brief biography is provided for each Justice on the Federal Judicial Center website.  Federal Judicial 
Center, “History of the Federal Judiciary,” 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetCourt?cid=0&order=c&ctype=sc&instate=na (accessed March 8, 2011). 
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 administration, appointed by him in January 2009.53  The SG is in charge of representing 
the United States’ position in lawsuits that reach the Supreme Court docket.54  He/she 
advises the executive branch and supervises litigation (including amicus filing and oral 
arguments) in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.  He/she also indirectly assists 
with docket selection by submitting opinions of the U.S. government to cases where it is 
not a party.55  Though Kagan’s time as SG was short, she played a vital role in many cases 
that will be argued in the 2010 – 2011 term.  That pre-judicial role fueled speculation into 
how she would choose to practice recusal, especially in comparison to the last SG 
appointed to the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall, examined earlier in this analysis.  For 
the 2010 – 2011 term, Kagan is recusing herself from 25 out of 51 cases because she either 
assisted writing a brief or she was actively participating in a case while it was litigated in 
lower courts, according to the Washington Post.56  The reputable SCOTUSblog.com also 
attributes the recusals to her filing a brief at the invitation of the Court of the U.S. 
government’s opinion, signing certiorari grants (memos she signed saying the U.S. 
government would not be involved), and recusing in cases where the United States is the 
petitioner.57  Because of the substantial amount of recusals in her first term some attorneys 
are going as far as holding out on applying for certiorari, so that they can be sure Kagan 
will sit the case.58  As prudent as Justice Kagan’s stance on Supreme Court recusal policy 
may be, her recusals are still largely unpredictable because of the arbitrary nature of the 
policy, for example, her past as SG is not stopping her from ruling on the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act. 
 
v.  U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (4) 
Section 455 (b) (4): where he/she, spouse or child has a financial stake in the 
outcome of the case; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.59  By 
now, the recusal issue most familiar with Section 455 (b) (4) is Clarence Thomas’s 
financial tie, and possible bias, related to Florida v. U.S.  Similarly, another 455(b)(4) 
recusal controversy revolves around Justice Scalia and the gender bias class action lawsuit 
against Wal-Mart.  The recusal issue is whether or not Justice Scalia will participate in the 
case when his son’s law firm is representing Wal-Mart.60   
 
                                                 
53
 Paul Kane and Robert Barnes, “ Senate confirms Elena Kagan’s nomination to Supreme Court,” The 
Washington Post, August 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080505247.html (accessed March 8, 2011). 
54
 U.S. Department of Justice, “About the Office.”  
55
 The Solicitor General would submit a petition for the Supreme Court to hear whichever case and the 
Court accepts about 70 percent to 80 percent of the cases the federal government petitions for.  (Epstein, 
Lee and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America, 19.) 
56
 Robert Barnes, “Kagan’s recusals take her out of action in many of the Supreme Court’s cases,” The 
Washington Post, October 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/03/AR2010100303890_2.html?sid=ST2010100303908 (accessed April 4, 
2011). 
57
 Tom Goldstein, “An update on recusal,” SCOTUSBlog.com, October 3, 2010,  
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/10/an-update-on-recusal/ (accessed April 7, 2011). 
58
 Stephen R. Shapiro, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union in Barnes, “Kagan’s recusals,” 
The Washington Post, October 4, 2010. 
59
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal,” 59. 
60
 “The Court’s Recusal Problem,” The New York Times, March 16, 2011, New York edition, A30. 
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 (1)  For example, current Chief Justice Roberts used to own stock in Pfizer Inc., a New 
York-based drug maker.  Even though his stock was worth no more than $15,000, 
practically pennies compared to Ginny Thomas’s earnings from The Heritage Foundation, 
he routinely recused himself from lawsuits involving the company.  Where it gets tricky is 
when we examine the financial stakes Justices previously had with a party to a case.  In this 
example, Justice Roberts’ recusal regimen changed when he sold his Pfizer stock holdings 
on August 31, 2010.  Now he is to sit on two Pfizer Inc. cases this term, according to a 
docket entry from September 2011.61 The short time – only a few months – between 
Roberts selling his company stock and then judging the Supreme Court case is not 
substantial enough to shed the appearance of bias.  In the same way that Justices like Elena 
Kagan and Thurgood Marshall recuse from cases they have associations with, recusal 
policy related to financial investments should be heavily exhibited as well, even six months 
or perhaps years after the fact – enough to remove the appearance that Justice Roberts may 
be bias.    
 
vi. Analyzing memoirs of past Justices 
(1)  One memoir tells of a letter written October 20, 1975 by then Associate Justice Byron 
White (in office 1962 – 1993).  It was delivered to seven of the eight other Justices – those 
seven having been present at a private meeting which excluded the eighth, William 
Douglas.  The year before Douglas had suffered a serious stroke and the eight other Justices 
thought he was no longer competent, at least in the interim, to serve as a judge.62 In the 
letter White indicated the participants met on October 17 and discussed and came to the 
decision that (1) “the Court [would] not assign the writing of any opinions to Mr. Justice 
Douglas,” and (2) “they would not hand down any judgment arrived at by a 5-4 vote where 
Mr. Justice Douglas is in the majority.”63 Conceptually, the Justices, commandeering 
Congress’s authority to impeach and remove judges, wanted Douglas to recuse himself and 
made the decision for him.64  This is a good example of ideological and strategic behavior, 
proving that a threat to the system has the power to make all judges work strategically 
together to advocate an ideological position they all believe in. 
 
SECTION TWO: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
As stated previously, section two utilizes data from The Supreme Court Database, 
which organizes hundreds of facts about tens of thousands of cases dating all the way back 
to 1946.65 Focusing on cases with only five, six, seven, or eight votes left over 2,000 cases 
in the data set and a random sample of forty cases was gathered from that set.66 The data 
                                                 
61
 Brent Kendall, “Chief Justice Roberts sells Pfizer shares,” The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882404575520133227381308.html (accessed April 5, 
2010).  
62
 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 88.) 
63
 Letter of October 20, 1975, reprinted in Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White, 
(New York: Free Press, 1998), 463-65. 
64
 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 89. 
65
 The Supreme Court database’s latest version, February 11, 2011, is used in this section and is available 
online at http://scdb.wustl.edu.  
66
 Supreme Court Database random sample of 40 cases where the number of votes is less than nine. Forty 
cases instead of a higher or lower amount for (1) brevity, being this paper has limits of its own, and (2) 
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 looks at cases where a Justice did not participate in order to: (1) concentrate on less-
controversial recusals; and (2) determine the more common grounds for recusal. Graphs 
and explanations conclude how often controversy surrounds Supreme Court recusals and 
why Supreme Court cases do not always have all nine Justices. 
The following table supplies the primary information regarding the forty randomly 
selected Supreme Court cases in which there were less than nine votes.  The table identifies 
a case number (which I assigned), lexis citation, date of decision, name, number of votes, 
recusant (with L or C – “Liberal” or “Conservative” ideological direction) and reason for 
nonparticipation, if obtainable.67  All the information in the table is self-explanatory except 
for the “reason” column. 68  The explanations in the “reasons” column state either one of 
the five subsections of United States Code Title 28 Section 455, “per curiam,” or “no info,” 
all clarified below for convenience.69   
Reference List: 
§455 (a) – Justice disqualified himself in a proceeding where his 
partiality was reasonably questioned 
§455 (b)(1) – Justice had personal knowledge of the evidence 
concerning the proceedings or previously expressed an 
opinion on the case’s outcome 
§455 (b)(2) – Justice had previously served as a lawyer or witness 
concerning the same case 
§455 (b)(3) – Justice had come into contact with the matter while in 
government employment 
§455 (b)(4) – Justice, spouse or child had a financial stake in the 
outcome of the case 
per curiam – means that the court released an opinion on the case as 
a single entity with the participating and nonparticipating 
Justices acting anonymously. 
T/R – meaning “technical recusal;” that the nonparticipating Justice 
was not present for oral arguments, therefore decided not to 
participate in the decision 
N/A – meaning “not applicable.”  This means that all the Justices 
were voting, none recusing, therefore there were only eight 
Justices on the Supreme Court when the case was being 
decided. 
J/D – meaning “jurisdictional dissent;” when the Justice disagrees 
with the Court’s assertion or denial of jurisdiction.  In The 
                                                                                                                                                 
because much of the case data in the Database and through other research methods on these forty cases lacks 
information pertaining to the specific grounds for non-participation. More detail on certain cases is provided 
in this paper’s endnotes.  
67
 For brevity’s sake I used the shortened case names for the table. The lexis citation is the U.S. Reporter 
Citation (usCite). The date of decision is defined as the day, month and year that the Supreme Court 
released its decision. The recusant(s) is the Justice that did not participate (I researched this independent of 
the Supreme Court Database). The ideologies of the recusants was determined using Martin-Quinn scores. 
Martin, Andrew and Kevin Quinn, “The Ideological History of the Supreme Court, 1937 – 2007,” 
http://www.targetpointconsulting.com/scotusscores-labels.html (accessed September 15, 2011). 
68
 The reasons for nonparticipation were obtained by me through research and my analysis thereof. 
69
 Section 455 (a) and (b) include prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree. 
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 Supreme Court Database these are counted as 
nonparticipations.7071    
no info –  meaning “no information.”  I was unable to find 
information related to a reason why the Justice did not 
participate – either I found nothing or I found that they 
recused for unspecific reasons.72 
                                                 
70
 The Supreme Court Database, “Online Code Book,” http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=vote 
71
  The phrase jurisdictional dissent comes from the idea of justiciable, meaning the Supreme Court’s power 
is limited to “cases” and “controversies.”  Characteristics that make a case nonjusticiable are advisory 
opinions, collusive suits , mootness, ripeness, and political questions.  A Justice would write a jurisdictional 
dissent if he/she thought one of these  characteristics applied to a Supreme Court docketed case. (Epstein, 
Lee and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America, 93-6.) 
72
 The reason why The Supreme Court Database does not have information on explanations for 
nonparticipation is because Supreme Court Justices are not required to disclose that information.  Instead, 
at the end of the opinion it will simply say, for example in U.S. v Nixon (1974), “Mr. Justice Rehnquist took 
no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.”  If this is the only information I can find on the 
recusal, then I will use “no info” under the “reason” column.  
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Case 
Number 
Lexis (L.) 
Citation 
Case Name Date of 
Decision 
Number 
of votes Recusant(s) Reason 
1 1981 U.S. 
L. 19 
NORTHWEST AIRLINES v. 
TRANS. WORKERS UNION 
1981-Apr-20 8 Blackmun(L) 
§455 (b)(2)i 
2 1982 U.S. 
L. 146 
U.S. v. HOLLYWOOD MOTOR 
CAR CO. 
1982-Jun-28 6 unknown 
per curiam 
3 1982 U.S. 
L. 6 
FIDELITY FEDERAL S & L v. DE 
LA CUESTA 
1982-Jun-28 8 Powell(C) 
no info 
4 1982 U.S. 
L. 163 
IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERV. v. 
MIRANDA 
1982-Nov-08 8 Unknown 
per curiam 
5 1983 U.S. 
L. 29 
AMER PAPER INST. v. AMER 
ELECTRIC POWER SERV.  
1983-May-16 8 Powell(C) 
no info 
6 1983 U.S. 
L. 117 
NORFOLK R. & HOUS. AUTH. v. C 
& P TELEPHONE OF VA 
1983-Nov-01 8 Powell(C) 
§455 (b)(3)ii 
7 1984 U.S. 
L. 64 
B. OF ED.,PARIS UNION SCHOOL 
DIST. NO. 95 v. VAIL 
1984-Apr-23 8 Marshall(L) 
§455 (b)(1)iii 
8 1984 U.S. 
L. 124 
RUCKELSHAUS, ADMIN, U.S. 
EPA v. MONSANTO 
1984-Jun-26 8 White(L) 
no info 
9 1984 U.S. 
L. 94 
HAWAII HOUSING AUTH. v. 
MIDKIFF 
1984-May-30 8 Marshall(L) 
§455 (b)(1)iv 
10 1985 U.S. 
L. 5 
COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM. v. WEINTRAUB 
1985-Apr-29 8 Powell(C) 
no info 
11 1985 U.S. 
L. 72 
BENNETT v. NEW JERSEY 1985-Mar-19 8 Powell(C) 
§455 (b)(3)v 
12 1985 U.S. 
L. 73 
BENNETT v. KENTUCKY DEPT 
OF ED. 
1985-Mar-19 8 Powell(C) 
§455 (b)(3)vi 
13 1985 U.S. 
L. 1524 
B. OF ED. OF OKLAHOMA CITY v. 
NAT. GAY TASK FORCE 
1985-Mar-26 8 Powell(C) 
§455 (b)(3)vii 
14 1986 U.S. 
L. 101 
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. 
LAVOIE 
1986-Apr-22 8 Stevens(L) 
no info 
Table 2.1: 40 Instances of Supreme Court Justice Nonparticipation 
15
Beamer: Judicial Recusal: On the Brink of Constitutional Change
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2012
   
1
6
 
15 1986 U.S. 
L. 1 
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES OF CA 
1986-Feb-25 8 Blackmun(L) 
no info 
16 1986 U.S. 
L. 87 
BOWEN v. AMERICAN HOSPITAL 
ASS. 
1986-Jun-09 8 Rehnquist(C) 
§455 (b)(4)viii 
17 1986 U.S. 
L. 88 
BOWEN v. MI ACADEMY OF 
FAMILY PHYSICIANS 
1986-Jun-09 8 Rehnquist(C) 
no info 
18 1987 U.S. 
L. 5190 
MULLINS COAL OF VA v. 
WORKERS' C.P., U.S. LABOR 
DEPT 
1987-Dec-14 8 N/A 
N/Aix 
19 1987 U.S. 
L. 4815 
CARPENTER et al. v. U.S. 1987-Nov-16 8 N/A 
N/Ax 
20 1988 U.S. 
L. 938 
ETSI PIPELINE PROJECT v. MO 1988-Feb-23 8 Kennedy(C) 
T/R 
21 1988 U.S. 
L. 946 
BOWEN v. GALBREATH 1988-Feb-24 8 Kennedy(C) 
T/R 
22 1988 U.S. 
L. 942 
U.S. v. THOMAS ROBINSON, JR. 1988-Feb-24 8 Kennedy(C) 
T/R 
23 1988 U.S. 
L. 2863 
CITY OF LAKEWOOD v. PLAIN 
DEALER PUBLISHING 
1988-Jun-17 7 Kennedy(C) and 
Rehnquist(C) 
T/R (Kennedy), no 
info (Rehnquist) 
24 1988 U.S. 
L. 2882 
PIERCE v. UNDERWOOD 1988-Jun-27 8 Kennedy(C) 
T/R 
25 1988 U.S. 
L. 3030 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS 
OF AM. v. BECK 
1988-Jun-29 8 Kennedy(C) 
T/R 
26 1989 U.S. 
L. 1738 
AMERADA HESS v. N.J. 
TAXATION DIV. 
1989-Apr-03 8 O’Connor(C) 
no info 
27 1991 U.S. 
L. 7061 
SOUTHWEST MARINE, INC. v. 
GIZONI 
1991-Dec-04 8 Thomas(C) 
T/R 
28 1991 U.S. 
L. 7262 
HUNTER & JORDAN v. BRYANT, 
JR. 
1991-Dec-16 7 Thomas (C) and 
unknown 
T/R (Thomas), per 
curiam (unknown) 
29 1991 U.S. 
L. 2815 
FORD MOTOR CR. CO. v. FL. 
DEPT OF REV 
1991-May-20 8 O’Connor(C) 
no info 
30 1991 U.S. 
L. 6501 
ZATKO v. CALIFORNIA 1991-Nov-04 8 Thomas(C) 
T/R 
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31 1992 U.S. 
L. 4537 
LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA 
COASTAL COUNCIL 
1992-Jun-29 8 Souter(L) 
J/D 
32 1994 U.S. 
L. 3779 
MORGAN STANLEY v. PACIFIC 
MUTUAL LIFE INSUR. 
1994-May-23 8 O’Connor(C) 
§455 (a)xi 
33 1998 U.S. 
L. 4002 
AT&T v. CENTRAL OFF. 
TELEPHONE 
1998-Jun-15 8 O’Connor(C) 
§455 (a)xii 
34 1999 U.S. 
L. 4200 
MARYLAND v. DYSON 1999-Jun-21 7 Breyer(L) and 
Stevens(L) J/Ds (both) 
35 2003 U.S. 
L. 8965 
RAYTHEON COMPANY v. 
HERNANDEZ 
2003-Dec-02 7 Souter (L) and 
Breyer(L) no info (both) 
36 2006 U.S. 
L. 1818 
OREGON v. GUZEK 2006-Feb-22 8 Alito(C) 
T/R 
37 2006 U.S. 
L. 4675 
HOUSE v. BELL, WARDEN 2006-Jun-12 8 Alito(C) 
T/R 
38 2006 U.S. 
L. 2496 
U.S. v. GRUBBS 2006-Mar-21 8 Alito(C) 
T/R 
39 2010 U.S. 
L. 4971 
STOP THE BEACH RENOUR v. FL 
DEPT OF ENV PROT. 
2010-Jun-17 8 Stevens(L) 
§455 (b)(4)xiii 
40 2010 U.S. 
L. 5540 
DEMARCUS ALI SEARS v. UPTON 2010-Jun-29 7 N/A 
N/Axiv 
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After examining Table 2.1 I simply compiled the recusal data that serves this 
paper’s main purpose – the reasons for nonparticipation – into Figure 2.1.73  
 
The most common occurrence is “no information,” due to the difficulty 
encountered when trying to find the exact reason for recusal.  The next common occurrence 
are “technical recusals,” due to the high number of cases the Court hears relative to the 
amount of time the Court spends in transition between Justices.  The next common 
occurrence is Section 455 (b) (3), but at a substantially less common occurring rate.  
Immediately this tells us that nonparticipation in the Supreme Court takes place less often 
because of recusal statute and more often because of technicalities with the Court system.  
Technical recusals, along with no information, not applicable, jurisdictional dissent, 
and per curiam, are not the focus of this paper but studying the rate at which they occur 
explains a lot about how The Supreme Court Database calculates its data on number of 
votes.  A pool of 2,000 or so case decisions with under nine votes over the past half a 
century does not automatically mean every nonparticipation was because of a conflict of 
interest.  In terms of ideologies of recusants, the table shows that 25 recusants were 
conservative, 12 were liberal and 8 were no information. Of those recusals, seven (28 
percent) of the conservative and four (25 percent) of the liberal were attributed to a recusal 
statute.  This proves that both ideologies recuse for formal reasons at similar rates, meaning 
that the problems with a lack of recusal are systemic and not associated with just one side 
of the political spectrum.  However, as previously established throughout this paper, 
Supreme Court recusal policy is not obligatory, so the Database also does not take into 
account cases that perhaps should but did not have less than nine votes because a conflict of 
interest or appearance of bias. 
                                                 
73
 The occurrences in Figure 2.1 add up to 44 instead of 40 because in Case Numbers 23, 28, 34, and 35 
there are two recusants, causing the number of reasons in the data set to be 44.  
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III. DISCUSSION 
  
After careful analysis of specific recusal cases, inconsistencies between procedure 
and execution of United States Code 28 Section 455 are evident.  While the policy’s text is 
clearly written and the Justices swear themselves to it, their interpretations of the text are of 
real consequence.  As former Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist declared during 
the Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia recusal controversy 
about Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, “there is no formal procedure for Court review of 
the decision of a Justice in an individual case.  This is because it has long been settled that 
each Justice must decide such a question for himself.”74  If that wasn’t explicit enough for 
recusal critics, Rehnquist’s involvement in Laird v. Tatum is – giving testimony before 
Congress on the constitutionality of an executive program and then eventually reviewing 
the same program’s constitutionality before the Supreme Court.   Controversies like these 
surrounding Supreme Court recusal policy are certainly not a new trend. 
Many Supreme Court recusal disputes are politically charged, especially in a 
polarized climate like today.  However, proponents on both sides of the political spectrum 
will still take notice to impropriety when evaluating nominees. The 1969 Senate rejection 
of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to the Chief Justice seat is evidence that the legislature is 
trying to keep a check on the Supreme Court’s power – deciding to reject the Fortas’ 
nomination for many different reasons and eventually leading to him stepping down from 
Associate Justice.75 Similarly in 1969, President Nixon attempted to nominate Clement 
Haynsworth to the Supreme Court who also was rejected by the Senate, conceivably for 
previously judging cases where he held a financial interest.76 77 Instances like these are 
ways in which the legislature reminds the Supreme Court that bad judicial behavior has its 
consequences; but this check on the Supreme Court only occurs during nominations – no 
Justice has ever been removed from office. However, impeachment might be more likely 
for Justice Thomas’s recusal case if the media paid as much attention to it as it did for 
                                                 
74
 Letter from Senators Patrick Leahy & Joseph I. Lieberman to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Jan 22, 
2004, reprinted in “Irrecusable & Unconfirmable,” 7 Green Bag 2d, 277-9. 
75
 Controversy surrounding Abe Fortas: First, it was public knowledge that Fortas had consulted President 
Johnson on executive affairs numerous times during Fortas’ time as Associate Justice. Second, Fortas had 
received $15,000 for speaking at American University on different occasions – money raised for the 
university by corporations that might presumably argue in front of the Supreme Court one day. Third, it was 
also discovered in 1969 that Fortas signed a contract with a wealthy investor, agreeing to trade legal advice in 
exchange for lifetime yearly payments of $20,000. After he failed to gain the Chief Justice seat it became clear 
that Fortas would probably face impeachment and consequently he resigned from the Supreme Court. 
Amanda Frost, “Keeping up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal,” University 
of Kansas Law Review, Vol. 53, 2005, https://litigation-
essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=53+Kan
.+L.+Rev.+531&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=ce89252e73d52fa0da84cbffb3e6167f  (accessed April 
12, 2011), 545. Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: a biography (Binghamton, New York: Yale University Press, 
1990), 352, 362, 374. 
76
 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 65. 
77
 Historians claim that Nixon’s nomination of Clement Haynsworth was rejected by Democrats as payback 
for Conservatives rejecting Fortas. Historians also claim that Johnson’s nomination of Fortas was rejected 
because Conservatives did not like the left turn the Court was taking.  (David Kaplan, “The Reagan Court – 
Child of Lyndon Johnson,” The New York Times, September 4, 1989, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE1DE1731F937A3575AC0A96F948260 (accessed 
March 20, 2011).) 
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Fortas – $686,589 is significantly more than the $15,000 Fortas received from associated 
parties.  
In Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia we concluded 
that the “appearance” of bias is a very loosely defined and heavily interpreted term.  
Associate Justice Scalia traveling and socializing with Dick Cheney, who was a party to a 
Supreme Court docketed case, does not signify an appearance of bias.  According to Scalia, 
friendships with parties to a case do not indicate possible nepotism or the “appearance” 
thereof.  Then Chief Justice Rehnquist also responded to the controversy, which fueled the 
fire, saying that every Justice strives to adhere to U.S.C. 28 and though the process may be 
different for each Justice, the recusal goals are the same; basically, the law exists but is 
extremely malleable to the Justice’s wants and needs – what seems a recusal goal for one is 
likely to be different for another.  Former Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall recused 
himself, more often than not, from NAACP cases between the time when he was 
nominated to the Supreme Court in 1967 until 1984, twenty-three years after leaving his 
post as NAACP Chief Counsel.  Looking back in time and being able to reference the 1984 
memorandum, even Marshall’s decision to end his “self-imposed blanket disqualification 
rule”78 that year was occasionally renounced where “the circumstances of an individual 
case persuade me, as with all cases, to do otherwise.”79  This helps us understand how 
dependent recusals are on a Justice’s rationale at a given point in time.  
Although the text of Congressionally mandated judicial recusal policy seems 
descriptive it’s clear that much of it depends on (1) Supreme Court interpretation, (2) 
individual Justices’ interpretations (in the instance that their recusal is the one in question), 
(3) the political climate, (4) the particular “place” a Justice might be in their judicial 
mindset and constitutionally interpretive development, (5) ideological motivations, and (6) 
strategic motivations. 
In regards to the first dependent variable, Supreme Court interpretation, the Court’s 
ruling in Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp (1988) is a good example.  The 
Supreme Court’s ruling that a judgment ought to be reversed if the sitting judge who 
decided the case was also, even unknowingly, connected financially to the outcome of the 
case.80  In the ruling the Supreme Court interpreted Section 455 (a)’s language – “might 
reasonably be questioned”81 to mean when a “reasonable person” would expect a recusal.82  
This ambiguous “reasonable person” test could be seen as an expansive or contractive 
adjustment to recusal policy.  It is all up to interpretation just as Section 455 (b)(4), “if the 
outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest,” is all up for 
interpretation.83  Ginny Thomas’s $686,589 involvement against the Affordable Care Act 
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is extremely substantial because a reasonable person making average per capita income 
would reasonably question her husband’s bias. 
In regards to the second dependent variable, individual Supreme Court Justice 
interpretations, Associate Justice Elena Kagan provides a good example compared to her 
counterparts.  She is more disciplined in her recusal policy than other Justices, making the 
task of overturning lower court decisions more difficult especially on those where a split 
vote is predicted.84  The difference is how she interprets the policy compared to another, 
plus before she was appointed she indicated her recusal from at least eleven cases – those in 
which she represented the U.S. government in her previous job as Solicitor General.85 
In regards to the third dependent variable, political climate, Associate Justice 
Kagan’s recusal habits are also of interest.  The relevance is intensified when combined 
with Associate Justice Thomas’s recusal habits. Many people are calling for Thomas to 
recuse himself when the Affordable Care Act inevitably reaches the Supreme Court 
judicature.  The same is being said about Kagan.  The state lawsuits against the 
healthcare bill began while Kagan was still Solicitor General, Kagan gave insight into the 
constitutionality of the bill during her Senate hearings and Kagan practically said how 
she would vote if she was to participate.86  Much of the reasoning behind Thomas and 
Kagan’s refusal to recuse is prompted by the political climate clouding the case itself.  
For the fourth dependent variable, two cases studied in Part II are good examples – 
Justice Rehnquist (less restrained in recusals than Kagan) in Laird v. Tatum (1972) and 
U.S. v Nixon (1974). Rehnquist divulged not recusing himself in Laird v. Tatum because 
his prior involvement as Assistant Attorney General on the government’s behalf was 
professional and not personal opinion.  In U.S. v Nixon, Rehnquist’s only explicative reason 
for recusing himself was a “past association.”  However, advising the Nixon administration 
as Assistant Attorney General in a surveillance program is also “past association.” 
In regards to the last two variables, ideological and strategic motivations, Justices 
naturally want to ideologically guide the development of the Constitution according to their 
beliefs – the principle reason they were nominated in the first place. In order to do that 
successfully, strategy is involved. Manipulating votes and imposing opinions on each other 
is effective but the most successful way is through recusal and knowing not to disqualify 
when there’s a close vote versus greater voting arrangements.  
 Finding a solution that tries to tackle every single inconsistency in Supreme Court 
recusal policy is a daunting task.  If the policy is tightened to the effect of prompting more 
judicial recusals, it’s more than possible that parties to a case would take advantage of it.  If 
Justices recuse themselves more often, the constitutional significance of having nine versus 
six voting on monumental cases, such as President Obama’s healthcare bill, would greatly 
diminish, in which case the Founding Fathers’ purpose of the Supreme Court would be 
nonexistent.  The following suggestions examine similar problems. 
 One suggestion is a “Justice in waiting,” most likely a retired Justice or one 
confirmed and awaiting a seat on the Court.  Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
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have a similar procedure for its high courts, guaranteeing a full court hears each case.87  
However this would cause bureaucratic problems with staff and possibly open up the 
floodgates for continuously inconsistent voting and internal deliberations. 
 A less drastic change is adopting American Bar Association Codes specific to 
Section 455.  For example, 455 (b) (2) could define the disqualification of a Justice being:  
When the judge knows that a lawyer in a proceeding is 
affiliated with a law firm in which a relative of the judge is a 
partner or has an ownership interest in the law firm. 
This describes the instances and appearances for recusal more narrowly than the current 
Title 28 text, calling for recusal regardless of the degree of affiliation and/or ownership.88  
A procedure like this calls for recusals in Scalia – Wal-Mart-type controversies. 
 A simpler adjustment could be a personal statement written by the Justice in 
question on his decision to sit the case.  The statement would address the rational of those 
who submitted the motion to recuse, developing recusal precedent for the future. 
Representatives Chris Murphy and Anthony Weiner are working on a bill based on it.89 
Any policy that encourages more frequent recusals also challenges the 
constitutionality of the court – the purpose of having a consistent nine votes to create 
balance between constitutional opinions.90  The constitutionality of judicial review depends 
on the input of nine Justices and when less than nine Justices vote, that judicial consensus 
is questioned.  
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist gave the best response regarding a Justice’s 
decision to sit on a case where there’s questionable partiality; that before a Justice is 
appointed to the Supreme Court they are likely to have voiced statements, comments, or 
opinions on any matter of subjects and when one day those subjects come before the Court, 
to appear ignorant on the matter “would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of 
bias.”91  No matter how controversial the statements, comments, or opinions on any matter 
may be, in the end, it would still be up to the Justice himself on whether to recuse 
himself/herself or not.  There are many cases where the line between conflict of interest and 
impartiality of Supreme Court Justices is blurred.  Justices are themselves solely 
responsible for judging their ability to be impartial but if Congress is moved to change the 
policy, their power of the Court’s jurisdiction and number of Justices can influence a great 
deal.92  However, policy implementation in Congress is an entirely different beast.   
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i
 Before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun worked for Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, a law firm 
representing Northwest Airlines.  “Dorsey History,” Dorsey & Whitney, LLP., 
http://www.dorsey.com/about/history/ (accessed April 12, 2011). 
ii
 City of Norfolk were making improvements to schools, streets and parks, and Justice Powell’s past 
employment with the Richmond School Board presented a conflict of interest.   
iii
 Justice Marshall was the lawyer who won the infamous Brown v. Board of Education, therefore his bias 
was already apparent when Board of Education v. Vail was placed on the Supreme Court docket. 
iv
 Before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall was a lawyer to a case fighting for equality in 
publicly-financed housing projects; Sweatt v Painter 339 U.S. 629 (1950).  
v
 Case revolved around funds from Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which presented a 
conflict of interest because of Justice Powell’s history with Richmond School Board. 
vi
 Ibid. 
vii
 National School Boards Association submitted amicus curiae, which presented a conflict of interest 
because of Justice Powell’s history with Richmond School Board. 
26
Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 3 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol3/iss1/8
  27 
                                                                                                                                                 
viii
 Justice Rehnquist did not participate because his son-in-law’s firm works for American Hospital 
Association.  Al Kamen, “Court Strikes Down  ‘Baby Doe’ Rules; Administration Rebuffed on Mandating 
Care of Handicapped Infants,” The Washington Post, June 10, 1986. 
ix
 The period between Justice Lewis’s retirement and Justice Kennedy’s nomination lasted from June 1987 
to Feb 1988, therefore the Court only had eight Justices sitting at that time. 
x
 Ibid. 
xi
 The Alzheimers Study Group which Justice O’Connor joined included a Morgan Stanley special advisor; 
“Sandra Day O’Connor, Bob Kerrey, and Other Head Alzheimers Study Group,”  Alzheimer’s Weekly, 
December 2, 2007, http://www.alzheimersweekly.com/content/sandra-day-oconnor-bob-kerrey-and-others-
head-alzheimers-study-group (accessed April 8, 2011). 
xii
 John O'Connor, husband of Justice O’Connor, worked for Fennemore Craig law firm, which represents 
AT&T. Also O'Connor used attorneys from this firm to help her prepare for confirmation hearings.  
“Fennemore Craig Celebrates 125 Years of Legal Service,” Fennemore Craig Attorneys, 
http://www.fclaw.com/about/history.cfm (accessed April 11, 2011). 
xiii
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conflict of interest.  Treanor, William “Steven’s Recusal Makes Difference in Florida Property Ruling,” 
The National Law Journal LegalTimes, June 17, 2010, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/stop-the-
beach-the-difference-a-recusal-can-make-.html (accessed April 15, 2011). 
xiv
 Stevens retired on June 29, 2010. 
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